Abstract. Garber (1983) and Je®rey (1991 Je®rey ( , 1995 have both proposed solutions to the old evidence problem. Je®rey's solution, based on a new probability revision method called reparation, has been generalized to the case of uncertain old evidence and probabilistic new explanation in Wagner 1997 Wagner , 1999 . The present paper reformulates some of the latter work, highlighting the central role of Bayes factors and their associated uniformity principle, and extending the analysis to the case in which an hypothesis bears on a countable family of evidentiary propositions. This extension shows that no Garber-type approach is capable of reproducing the results of generalized reparation.
1. Introduction 1.1 Old Explanation and New Evidence. A basic principle of scienti¯c inference asserts that if hypothesis H in known to imply the less-than-certain proposition E, the subsequent discovery that E is true con¯rms (i.e., raises the probability of) H.
There is a straightforward Bayesian account of such con¯rmation, for from p(EjH) = 1 > p(E) it follows immediately that p(HjE) > p(H). This hypothetico-deductive principle extends in a natural way to the case of probabilistic old explanation and uncertain new evidence:
¤
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Je®rey and Brian Skyrms for enlightening discussions. 1 Theorem 1. If H is p-positively relevant to E and new evidence prompts a revision of p to q by probability kinematics on fE; ¹ Eg, with q(E) > p(E), then q(H) > p(H).
Proof:
Since q(H) = q(E)p(HjE)+q( ¹ E)p(Hj ¹ E) and p(H) = p(E)p(HjE)+p( ¹ E)p(Hj ¹ E), it follows that q(H) ¡ p(H) = (q(E) ¡ p(E))(p(HjE) ¡ p(Hj ¹ E)) > 0, the¯rst factor being positive by assumption and the second by the p-positive relevance of H to E (hence, of E to H). ¤
Old Evidence and New Explanation . Suppose that we¯rst attain certainty
regarding E and subsequently discover, quite apart from this certainty, that H implies E. Just as it does when explanation preceeds observation, this explanation of the previously known fact E by the hypothesis H ought to raise the probability of H, but how ? This problem was¯rst posed by Glymour (1980) , who called it the old evidence problem. As Glymour noted, conditioning the prior p here on E is otiose since p(E) = 1, and so p(HjE) = p(H).
One proposed solution to this problem, due to Garber (1983) , extends the algebra on which probabilities are de¯ned to include the proposition H`E that H implies E, and then conditions on H`E. Elaborating Garber's proposal, Je®rey (1983) showed that from p(E) = 1, along with certain additional assumptions about p, it follows that p(HjH`E) > p(H). A critique of these assumptions appears in Eells (1990) and Earman (1992).
More recently, Je®rey (1991 Je®rey ( , 1995 has proposed a di®erent solution to the old evidence problem, one that retains the original algebra, but revises probabilities by an entirely new method called reparation. A key feature of Je®rey's approach is the imaginative reconstruction of a probability distribution that predates both our certainty regarding E and our discovery that H implies E. The explanation-based revision of this ur-distribution then serves as a paradigm for all explanation-based revisions.
In Wagner 1997 Wagner , 1999 Je®rey's new solution was shown to generalize in a natural way to cases in which observation raises our con¯dence in E without rendering it certain and the subsequent explanation a®orded E by H is probabilistic rather than implicational. The present paper reformulates some of this work, highlighting the central role of Bayes factors and their associated uniformity principle, and extending the analysis to the case in which an hypothesis bears on a countable family of evidentiary propositions. This extension shows that no Garber-type approach is capable of reproducing the results of generalized reparation.
The notational conventions of this paper are as follows: If q 2 is a revision of the probability distribution q 1 , and A 1 and A 2 are propositions, the Bayes factor¯q 2 ;q 1 (
is the ratio
, q 1 (A 1 ) q 1 (A 2 ) of new-to-old odds. A special case of the foregoing, the q-likelihood ratio of hypothesis H on evidence E , denoted¸q(H; E), arises when q 1 = q; q 2 (¢) = q(¢jE), A 1 = H and A 2 = ¹ H. In this case, Bayes' rule yields the simple formula¸q(H; E) = q(EjH)=q(Ej ¹ H).
The revision q 2 is typically (and, in 
Reparation Generalized
The generalization of reparation in Wagner 1997 Wagner , 1999 takes as its starting point a probability distribution p on the algebra A generated by H and E. Empirical investigation (observation) has contributed to a certain measure of con¯dence in E, as re°ected in the value p(E). We subsequently discover, quite apart from such observation, theoretical considerations that indicate that the truth of H would confer probability u on E, and its falsity would confer probability v on E (explanation).
How should p be revised in light of this theoretical discovery?
Adapting a key feature of Je®rey's approach, we resurrect a notional ur-distribution p 0 predating both observation and explanation, where
The assumption is that p has come from p 0 by probability kinematics (Je®rey 1983 (Je®rey , 1988 ) on fE; ¹ Eg.
Suppose that we made the aforementioned theoretical discovery in the conceptual state captured by p 0 , and that this discovery left the ur-probability of H unchanged.
This would warrant the revision of p 0 to the unique distribution p 1 satisfying
The conceit is that the explanatory learning (logico-mathematical in the case treated by Je®rey, probabilistic in the present case) is the same in the ur-conceptual state as it is in the state in which it actually occurs. Since what is learned is the same in both cases, the uniformity principle, described above in x1.2, dictates that the appropriate explanation-based revision q of p should be determined by the Bayes factor identity
The distribution q may also be shown to come from p 1 by probability kinematics on fE; ¹ Eg, where¯q ;p1 (E : ¹ E) =¯p ;p0 (E : ¹ E). So the appropriate explanationbased revision of the observation-based revision p of p 0 coincides with the appropriate observation-based revision of the explanation-based revision p 1 of p 0 .
2 The credentials of the uniformity principle are strengthened by its entailment of this intuitively desirable commutativity of observation-and explanation-based revisions.
In e®ect, Je®rey treated the special case of the above in which p(E) = 1; p 1 (EjH) = 1, and p 1 (Ej ¹ H) = p 0 (Ej ¹ H). In that case it turns out that q(H) > p(H), i.e., that H is always con¯rmed. In the general case it is of course not necessarily true that q(H) > p(H), and so it is of interest to identify conditions su±cient to ensure that H is con¯rmed. In the next section we describe two such conditions originally appearing in Wagner 1997 Wagner , 1999 , but formulated here in a way that highlights the central role of the Bayes factor¯p ;p 0 (E : ¹ E). Under the assumption of the ur-independence of hypothesis H and evidence E, these conditions coalesce, furnishing an exact old evidence/new explanation analogue of Theorem 1.
Confirmation
It is useful to formulate the con¯rmation of H in terms of the inequality q(H)=q( ¹ H) > p(H)=p( ¹ H) rather than the equivalent inequality q(H) > p(H). The most salient formulas for these odds are
where (3.3)¯:=¯p ;p 0 (E : ¹ E):
3 Theorem 2. If¯> 1 and either
Proof: Obvious ¤ Note that (3.1) and (3.2) imply, respectively, that 
The results in the following section admit of a similar generalization.
Finer Evidentiary Partitions
The above approach may be extended to the case in which the hypothesis H bears on a countable family fE i g of mutually exclusive, exhaustive evidentiary propositions.
Here p comes from the ur-distribution p 0 by probability kinematics on fE i g , and the explanation-based revision p 1 of p 0 is de¯ned by the conditions (i)
Let A be the ¾-algebra generated by H and fE i g and A ¤ the set of atomic propositions HE i and
As in x2, we again de¯ne the explanation-based revision q of p by means of the uniformity principle:
In order for q to be well-de¯ned by (4.1), however, we need to postulate here that
for setting A 1 = A and A 2 = HE 1 , say, in (4.1) yields
, and since we must have P A2A ¤ q(A) = 1, this implies (4.2). It is straightforward to show that (4.2) is equivalent to
Hence, in particular, q is well-de¯ned if
6 (4.6)
As in x2, q comes here from p 1 by probability kinematics on fE i g with (4.7)¯q ;p 1 (E i : E j ) =¯p ;p 0 (E i : E j ); 8 i; j ;
and so explanation-and observation-based revisions also commute in this more general setting.
The generalizations here of formulas (3.1) and (3.2) are
; and (4.8)
or, equivalently,
; and (4.10) .11) where¯i :=¯p ;p 0 (E i : E 1 ) .
The generalization of Theorem 2 is
Theorem 5. Let I be a nonempty, proper subset of the set of positive integers indexing
Proof: Show that a) the numerator of the right-hand side of (4.10) is greater than its counterpart in (4.11) and b) the denominator of the right-hand side of (4.10) is no greater than its counterpart in (4.11). Assertion a) is equivalent to (4.12)
where
. Now 8i = 2 I : ± i · 0 and 8i 2 I : ± i > 0, and
Let (4.14) m := sup i= 2I f¯ig:
If 8 i 2 I :¯i = m, then 8 i = 2 I :¯i < m. But by (4.13) , 9 i = 2 I :
The proof of assertion b) is similar. ¤
There is an obvious generalization of Theorem 4 here, which is left as an exercise.
There appears to be a generalization of Theorem 3 here only when q is well-de¯ned in virtue of (4.6) :
Theorem 6. Suppose that q is well-de¯ned in virtue of (4.6), and let I be a nonempty, nite, proper subset of the set of positive integers indexing fE i g. If E := [ i2I E i and (4.17)
then q(H) > p(H) for p(E) su±ciently large.
Proof: Let 
Let m denote the minimum of the bracketed expressions in the above sum. By 
, and p 0 ( ¹ HjE i ) by p( ¹ HjE i ), and applying (4.6) yields ± 6 Bp(
B=p 0 ( ¹ H). From these inequalities the asserted facts follow. ¤
It is natural to ask if Garber's approach to the old evidence problem might be extended to the case of uncertain old evidence and probabilistic new explanation.
This would involve extending the algebra A to include a (very complex) proposition R expressing the newly discovered relevance relations between H and the E i 's and ¹ H and the E i 's, and conditioning an extension of the probability distribution p on R. If the aim is to produce in this way the same explanation-based revision q of p e®ected by generalized reparation, then this aim cannot always be attained, not even in a purely formal way, as the following analysis shows.
By a well-known result of Diaconis and Zabell (1982, Theorem 2.1) , q, as de¯ned by (4.1), can come from p by \superconditioning" p on such a proposition R if and only if
Consider the case of a countably in¯nite partition fE i g, where
The Diaconis-Zabell superconditioning criterion (4.25) fails to hold here since, for example, q(HE i )=p(HE i ) = 22 ¢ 2 i =29 for i¸2. Hence no Garber-type derivation of q from p is possible.
8
Note that H is con¯rmed here by the new probabilistic explanation of the E i in terms of H and ¹ H, since q(H) = 16=29 > 1=2 = p(H).
Notes
1. See Wagner 1997, Theorem 2. The symbol / denotes proportionality and (2.2) yields the exact formula
2. It seems reasonable prima facie that the appropriate observation-based revision q of p 1 should come from p 1 by probability kinematics on fE; ¹ Eg, where¯q ;p 1 (E : ¹ E) = p;p0 (E : ¹ E), but we need not rely on this intuition. For under the assumption that what is learned from observation is the same, whether before or after explanation, the uniformity principle would dictate that the appropriate observation-based revision q of p 1 be determined by
But from the fact that p comes from p 0 by probability kinematics on fE; ¹ Eg, along with (i), it follows that q comes from p 1 by probability kinematics on fE; ¹ Eg, with
. For further elaboration of the uniformity principle, with additional applications, see Wagner 2000.
3. Formulas (3.1) and (3.2) are algebraic variants of formulas (2) and (3) 4. See, e.g., the Appendix of Richard Je®rey's \Probabilistic Epistemology", at http:== www.princeton.edu=~bayesway .
5. Since p 0 is assumed, inter alia, to predate the discovery of a certain relevance relation between H and E, it is natural to explore the consequences of assuming that p 0 predates knowledge of any such relevance relation.
6. As in x2, (4.1) is equivalent to the formula q(A)=p(A) / p 1 (A)=p 0 (A); 8A 2 A ¤ .
The equivalence of (4.2) and (4.3) follows from the fact that
which follows from the fact that p(HE i )=p 0 (HE) = p( ¹ HE i )=p 0 ( ¹ HE i ) = p(E i )=p 0 (E i ), since p comes from p 0 by probability kinematics on fE i g. It is obvious that (4.4) and 14 (4.5) each imply (4.3). Finally, (4.6) implies (4.5) since p 1 (H) = p 0 (H).
7. Here p(HjE i ) = p 0 (HjE i ) = 1=2 for all i, and so p comes from p 0 by probability kinematics on fE i g. Also, p 1 (H) = p 0 (H) = 1=2, P i¸1 p 1 (E i jH) = 1=2+ P i¸2 1=2 i = 1, and P i¸1 p 1 (E i j ¹ H) = 3=4 + P i¸2 1=2 i+1 = 1. Moreover,
and so the well-de¯nedness condition (4.2) holds.
8. Of course, even when q can be derived from p by superconditioning, e.g., whenever the partition fE i g is¯nite, the conditioning proposition R is purely abstract, and would require a detailed elaboration to furnish a Garber-type derivation of q.
